* She described these measures as a military coup and started promoting this coup through her journalists, in the hope that they would help her return to the positions of power again. The question here: Was the alleged coup against an elected civilian government so that the people and the international community would come to its aid?!! Or was it against a gang that stole the effort of the youth?!!
The government of the farm group, the first to demand its reform and correction of its course, are the young people who have the real interest in the change. Of which. The Umma Party also suspended its activity with Qaht, as did the Professional Association, which played a major role in the political movement. This is how he withdrew from Qaht, all those who had previously supported her, after her truth was revealed to them, and they fled from her sinking boat in search of salvation. It is praiseworthy for Al-Burhan that it was the unidentified sea funeral tomb to its final resting place, after it was removed from it inside and outside.
* The actions of October 25 were carried out by its partner in government in response to the demands of the street, and not a coup against the democratic transition, because there was no democratic transition in Sudan. The best evidence of this is that America questioned the reality of the democratic transition in Sudan, and for this reason it supported it only with a handful of flour.
* The external forces are in a state of confusion, because the military are the ones who demand the elections that are rejected by the civilians, who demand an extension of the transitional period for fifteen years so that Sudan becomes in a state of permanent transition. A transitional period. A transitional government. A transitional constitution. With its contradictory positions, it seeks to exclude the military from the political scene, while it seeks an alliance with Al-Hilu and Abdel Wahid, and is courting the rebel movements that did not sign the peace agreement. Qaht refuses to negotiate openly with the military and negotiates with them secretly in the dark.
* This behavior and approach proves that a pragmatic system has no principles and the end justifies the means.
* Greet has been doing her best to end and overthrow the alleged coup for more than (10) months, and it did not succeed. However, she described it as a failure, as she claimed that Hemeti described those measures as a failed coup, even though Hemeti did not mention the word coup in his speech.
* The content of Hemedti’s talk here is that the October 25 procedures were not implemented, and this confirms his talk that Nimeiri was Karp Qash, and this also confirms his opinion on the army’s withdrawal from the Tripartite Mechanism dialogue. All of this confirms that Hemedti was not satisfied with the slowness and hesitation that required the implementation of the October 25 procedures, which led to a state of frustration among the citizens.
* After Qaht failed to overthrow the October 25 corrective measures, it sought to wreak havoc and strife between Hemeti and Al-Burhan by talking about the competition between them, their conflicts and their unspoken differences, and these are false allegations and incorrect analyzes and interpretations of their conversations.
* What Qaht has done in this field are malicious rumors that come within the framework of psychological warfare directed against them by questioning their competence, professionalism and integrity. Those who spread these rumors have passed away that the military are immune to psychological warfare because they were trained on how to resist it.
* It has caused a deep and deep rift in the relations between civilians and the military, which will have negative repercussions on the political life in Sudan.
* The expected coup that Dr. Ibrahim Al-Amin referred to, if it actually happened, would be a brazen military coup to prove to civilians that the military are more capable than them in managing state affairs because they are people of thought, knowledge and strategy that they obtained from their Higher Military Academy, which is the largest center for strategic studies in Sudan.
* She has become today the biggest threat to Sudanese national security, and hence the October 25 measures for security conditions in order to preserve the entity of the state.
* Hemedti, who is being targeted by Qaht now, has previously described him as “Dakran” who frightened the cobs, and this is an implicit recognition from her of the role he played in overthrowing the previous regime when he announced during the political movement that he would protect the demonstrators.
* Hemedti played a major role in establishing security in Darfur by breaking the thorns of the rebel movements in the qualitative operation of Goz Dango. He also exerted a great effort in tribal reconciliations and providing humanitarian aid to citizens in various states.
* Hemedti proved that he is a man of peace if the state adopts a policy of peace and a knight of war if the state adopts a policy of war.
* This man spread the culture of peace throughout the country and had a permanent presence in all situations and proved that he is a statesman of a unique style, where his words are combined with his actions, and he has a high ability to take the right decision at the right time and place, as well as enjoying strong political and military charisma, transparency, openness and complete clarity.
The man was not affected by the indiscriminate campaign targeting him and his forces, as they accepted all of this with open arms and strict military discipline, and proved the truth to those who accuse them of militias of being regular, disciplined forces established by law, which are at the core of the organization of the Sudanese army and operate under the command of the Commander in Chief.
* These forces are not parallel to the army and are not a substitute for it, and they are not a Sudanese heresy, as there are similar ones in all countries of the world under different names, such as the Revolutionary Guards in Iran, Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, the Popular Army in Iraq, and the Rapid Deployment Forces in America…etc.
* The scarecrow of the multiplicity of armies in Sudan was brought by external forces and adopted by it, with the intention of dismantling and weakening the army, because it stood as an impenetrable dam against foreign plans to divide Sudan.
* The multiplicity of armies is also present in nearby Egypt, where the name of the third Egyptian army that crossed the Suez Canal appeared in the October War of 73, and in the Russian-Ukrainian war the name of the Russian Army No. (49) appeared. These are some examples of the multiplicity of armies in other countries.
* The multiplicity of armies is a source of strength, not an element of weakness. The army is a military organization, just like the organization of divisions and legions. This diversity in one country does not mean that these organizations operate as isolated islands, but rather work under one central command that imposes complete control over them all, regardless of their number.
Sudan, with its large size, can only be protected by the multiplicity of armies in it, so that it has five field armies operating under a unified central command at the rate of a field army for each strategic direction and a field army for the Red Sea region due to its strategic importance and a central military area based in the Al-Obeid region, where movement is facilitated by it to support any field army.
* Diversity in Sudan is a source of strength that represents one nation, and diversity in armies represents one army.
*Sudan is targeted for its wealth, huge resources, and distinguished geopolitical position. For this reason, the Salvation focused on preparing the forces to confront that targeting, so it established the Popular Defense Forces, activated the national service, trained the mujahideen and tanks, and established the Rapid Support Forces.
* Salvation also established the defense system that liberated the military decision of Sudan.
*Armys are built by politics and not by miraculous annual budgets, and the politicians in Sudan do not realize this fact, which the military realize.
Salvation I realized early on that any organized political action that seeks to bring about change and reform in Sudan can only succeed if it is supported and backed by the army, and that is why I was interested in supporting and strengthening the army.
* It has targeted the army since its first day and sought to exclude it from the political scene, but failed and committed suicide politically.
* Military participation in power in all third world countries is more than necessary in order to maintain security and political stability in all third world countries because these countries did not achieve national consensus or harmony in their internal fabric, nor did they define their national constants, outline their supreme national goals, and agree on their constitutions. In addition to the problems of power struggle, tribal conflicts, ignorance, disease, backwardness and poverty.
* Qaht did not recognize the participation of the military in power because she claimed that the responsibility of governance is the responsibility of civilians only.
* There is an old and renewed intellectual debate in the field of who is fit to rule in Sudan, a civilian politician or a military man who understands politics, and the answer to this question puts an end to the infernal cycle in which Sudan has been revolving since independence to this day.
* The experience of the military in power was successful, and their achievements are what the country is going through now. As for the experience of civilians in power, it was a failure because they were unable to dig a canal or open a small stream.
* All that the civilians succeeded in was the devastation and destruction of what the military built, in addition to placing the country under the umbrella of international trusteeship. It failed during three years to transform the youth revolution into a state where it continued to rule Sudan from the street with hollow slogans that did not descend into reality.
* The withdrawal of the military component from the dialogue of the tripartite mechanism is intended to make way for ensuring the consensus of civilians, and this withdrawal does not mean the withdrawal of the military completely from the political scene because the participation of the military in power in all third world countries is more than necessary in order to maintain security and political stability in those countries as indicated So above.
* The importance of the participation of the military in power in developed countries, as is the case in America, European countries, and all countries that pursue democracy as a way to govern.
* She refused all initiatives and presented her initiative to harm, as she only sees what she sees.
* All the initiatives failed, including one that evaded because those who presented the initiatives had a personal and partisan agenda and the interests of external forces. Also, those who participated in the crisis cannot be part of this solution, in addition to that these initiatives were not built on the idea of a comprehensive political project for all the people of Sudan .
* As for the initiative of the People of the Sudan, it was presented by a party that has nothing to do with politics and does not want to take power. This initiative has merged with other initiatives and has become the essence of the initiatives and what is required to be adopted and a decision to implement it urgently because it represents the voice of the silent majority and the absolute majority suffices here in the event that the comprehensive political agreement that was obstructed by Qaht is not possible.
* The visit of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to Khartoum at this time came to nullify the effect of this national initiative. You note the frequency of visits by the Criminal Court to Khartoum when there are signs of a comprehensive political settlement.
* Khartoum is not a member of the International Criminal Court and does not have the right to demand that it open an office in Khartoum.
* The disaster of natural conditions, the suffocating political crisis, the blockage of the political horizon, the crushing economic crisis, the security fragility, the constitutional vacuum and the state of no state all necessitate accelerating the formation of a strong central government that includes independent national competencies to manage the transitional period.
* In summary: The October 25 procedures achieved a resounding success and did not fail because they corrected the strategic mistake that the Military Council made by handing over power to an unelected civilian minority that had no role in the youth revolution because it joined it eleven days after its success and stole and aborted it.
* The October 25 procedures transformed Qaht to street opposition without a constitutional, legal and popular basis that protects it, and thus facilitates the process of resolving it by the force of law and the power of the state.
* The Transitional Military Council is the one that brought down the previous regime and its legitimacy, and it should have formed the civilian government to manage the transitional period on its own.
In conclusion: I ask God to preserve the wounded homeland by the actions of its people who covet power without thought, without political awareness and strategic vision, and without considering the interests of the Sudanese people, and may God have mercy on those who said that backward thinking is more dangerous to strategy than backward weapons. God luck.
Lieutenant-General Hassan Yahya Muhammad Ahmed, Fellowship of the Nimeiri Higher Military Academy, National Defense College/ Quoted from Al-Antibaha
